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When the Food and Drug Administration approved the Norplant
contraceptive for use in the United States in December 1990, commentators hailed it as the greatest advance in contraceptive technology
since the pill.' Once implanted under the skin of a woman's upper
arm, the Norplant device provides up to five years of contraception
without any further effort on the woman's part.2 Upon removal of the
device, fertility generally returns within months.3 Given its convenience and effectiveness, 4 Norplant appears to be the contraceptive of
the future.
VII.

CONCLUSION .............................

*Dedicated to my grandparents, James and Pauline Austin, and Sam Taylor. Dedicated, as
well, to the memory of Willa Taylor.
1. See Steven Findlay, News You Can Use: Birth Control, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 24, 1990, at 58; Andrew Purvis, A Pill that Gets Underthe Skin, TIME, Dec. 24, 1990, at 66.
2. Findlay, supra note 1, at 58-59.
3. Id.
4. See text accompanying supra note 2; infra notes 31-33.
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Norplant also may be the newest weapon of courts and prosecutors
in their effort to stop child abuse. Barely a month after FDA approval,
a California case sparked a national debate over requiring Norplant
as a probation condition for a child abusing mother. 5 In September
1990, twenty-seven year-old Darlene Johnson pleaded guilty in Tulare
County Superior Court to three felony counts of child abuse after
beating her two children with a belt and extension cord. 6 According
to Judge Howard Broadman, Johnson "beat the tar" out of her children
leaving scars on their backs and necks. 7 When sentencing Johnson in
January 1991, Judge Broadman offered her a choice: four years in jail
or one year in jail and three years on probation with the condition
that she use Norplant. 8 Johnson chose probation and Norplant, but
later appealed the sentence. 9 In defending his sentence, Judge Broadman claimed Norplant was necessary to protect future children from
Johnson's abusive behavior. 10 A California appeals court eventually

5. See, e.g., Billy Allstetter, Compulsory Contraception; Does the Punishment Fit the
Crime?, AM. HEALTH: FITNESS OF BODY AND MIND, May 1991, at 32; Beverly F. Baker,
Sentenced to Norplant, NETWORK NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 6; Mary Cantwell, Editorial
Notebook: Coercion and Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, § 4, at 16; Stephanie Denmark, Birth-Control Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at 23; John P. MacKenzie, Editorial
Notebook: Whose Choice Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at A22; Helen R. Neuborne,
In the Norplant Case, Good Intentions Make Bad Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, at M1; Tim
Rutten, Norplanting or Supplanting PrivateRights, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1991, at El; When
a Mother Beats Her Children; Why Coerced Birth Control Is Not the Way to Deal with Child
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at B6.
6. Michael Lev, Judge Is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17; Mark Stein, Judge Stirs Debate with Ordering of Birth Control,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3 [hereinafter Stein, Judge Stirs Debate]; Mark Stein, Judge
to Let Birth Control Order Stand, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A3.
7. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate, supra note 6, at A3.
8. Lev, supra note 6, at A17. Judge Broadman is known for his creative sentences. See
id. In one case, he offered probation to a thief who stole two six packs of beer on the condition
that the man wear a T-shirt reading on the front, "MY RECORD AND TWO SIX PACKS
EQUAL FOUR YEARS," and on the back, "I AM ON FELONY PROBATION FOR THEFT."
Johnd Hurst, ControversialJudge Dodges Not Only Critics, but Bullet, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1991, at A3 (summarizing Judge Broadman's background, and his propensity for creative sentencing). Later, the man was arrested for another theft because a witness identified him by the
T-shirt. Id.
9. Birth Control Order Is Appealed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at B8; Lev, supra note 6,
at A17.
10. Lev, supra note 6, at A17.
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dismissed Johnson's appeal as moot in April 1992, after she was imprisoned for an unrelated violation of her probation conditions."
Unfortunately, child abuse similar to what occurred in the Johnson
case is a recurring tragedy in our society. In 1989 alone, approximately
2.4 million reports of suspected child maltreatment were filed in the
United States. More than 900,000 of these cases were officially substantiated. 13 Indeed, the 1980s saw steady increases in the aggregate
number of children abused and in the rate of child abuse in the United
States. 14 In addition to these discouraging statistics, a new form of
abuse has emerged: women who harm their unborn children by using
drugs during pregnancy.' 5 As one U.S. government report stated,
these trends represent "an extremely serious social problem requiring
a major societal response.' 6 Stopping child abuse calls for creative
solutions from all sectors of government - including the courts. 17 In
this regard, Judge Broadman's Norplant condition in the Johnson case
is a new approach to preventing child abuse, and courts in other
jurisdictions may adopt his solution in the future.

11. Karen Southwick, Use Norplant,Don't Go to Jail:Judges, Social Workers and Medical
Professionals Debate the Ethic, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1992, at 13. After Planned Parenthood
and the California chapter of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists filed
briefs in the ACLU-sponsored appeal, Johnson tested positive for cocaine and was sentenced
to prison. Id.
12. U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE

TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 15 (1990) [hereinafter CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT].

13. Id.
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUlIAN SERVICES, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF
NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3-1 to -15 (1988).

Between 1980 and 1986, the rate of child abuse in the United States went up from 5.3 out of
every 1000 children to 9.2 out of every 1000 children. Id. at 3-5. In 1980, the total number of
children abused in the United States was 336,600. Id. By 1986, this number had climbed to

580,400. Id.
15. See Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). Although maternal drug
and alcohol abuse is not typically classified as child abuse, for the purposes of this note it is
included as a form of child abuse. The legislature of at least one state, Ohio, has termed this

conduct "prenatal child neglect." See Ohio S.B. No. 324, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (198990), discussed in Roberts, supra, at 1463 n.217.
16.

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 12, at 15.

17. See id. at 46-95. At least two studies include the courts as part of their solutions to
the problem of child abuse. See id. at 87-89; U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON
FAIILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 33-45 (1984).
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The Johnson case, however, raises several intriguing issues. Critics
of Judge Broadman's sentence have complained that forcing Johnson
to use Norplant violates her constitutional right to privacy and, in
particular, her right to procreate.' On the other hand, supporters of
Judge Broadman's sentence have noted that courts have great discretion when setting probationary conditions.9 Because probationers are
convicted criminals, they do not enjoy the same liberties as other
citizens.2° Accordingly, courts may, and do, impose probation conditions which impinge upon the constitutional rights of the convicted.21
This note assesses the validity of requiring Norplant as a probation
condition in child abuse cases. The analysis will include typical child
abuse cases like the Johnson case where the abuse occurs post-birth.
This note will also examine situations where the mother harms her
child in utero by using drugs like cocaine while pregnant. Although
a Norplant condition may burden several constitutional rights of a
probationer,- this note only addresses the probationer's right to procreate. While the Johnson case and its Norplant condition frame the
inquiry of this note, the analysis applies equally to probation conditions
which prohibit conception or pregnancy without specifying a particular
contraceptive.
After a more detailed description of Norplant in part I of this note,
part II examines the right to procreate as defined in United States
Supreme Court cases. Part III examines the power courts have to
fashion probationary conditions and how a "reasonableness" requirement and the Constitution limit a court's power. Part IV reviews
three state appellate court decisions involving probation conditions
similar to Johnson's - conditions prohibiting conception or pregnancy
without specifying a particular contraceptive. These decisions suggest
that Judge Broadman's Norplant condition is invalid. Part V analyzes
the Norplant condition in light of the constitutional and reasonableness

18. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 5.
19. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
22. See Jack P. Lipton & Colin F. Campbell, The Constitutionalityof Court-Imposed Birth
Control as a Condition of Probation, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271, 272 (1989). In addition
to burdening the right to procreate, a Norplant condition also may violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. See id. Furthermore, a condition mandating
the use of contraception may violate the probationer's First Amendment freedom of religion.
See id. If the probationer is Catholic, then forcing her to use contraception would contradict
the tenets of her church. See id. at 279-82.
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tests and concludes that a Norplant condition fails one or both tests
in all child abuse cases. Part VI suggests an alternative to a Norplant
condition which meets the reasonableness test and respects the probationer's right to procreate. This note concludes that because an alternative.exists, courts may not impose Norplant as a probation condition
in child abuse cases.
I.

NORPLANT: USE, EFFICIENCY, AND SIDE EFFECTS

The Norplant device consists of six silicone rubber tubes, each the

size of a match stick, containing synthetic progestin hormone.2 The
tubes are implanted in a fan-like array under the skin of a woman's
upper arm.2 The implant procedure is simple.? The procedure lasts
26
only ten to fifteen minutes and is conducted under local anesthetic.
Once implanted, Norplant is barely visible under the skin.27 The
Norplant tubes release a measured amount of progestin into the
woman's blood stream for up to five years.2 At any time during the
five years, the device can be removed in a procedure almost as simple
and painless as the implantation.2
Norplant is the most effective, reversible contraceptive on the
market in the United States.w During the first year of use, Norplant's

23. Marian Segal, Norplant: Birth Control at Arm's Reach, FDA CONSUMER, May 1991,
at 9. The synthetic hormone used in Norplant is levonorgestrel. Id. Progestin has long been
used in birth control pills. Id. For a more thorough discussion of Norplant, see generally Jan
Flattum-Riemers, Norplant: A New Contraceptive, AM. FAi. PHYSICIAN, July 1991, at 103
(discussing Norplant, its efficiency and side effects, with some technical language and cited
sources); Tamar Lewin, 5-Year ContraceptiveImplant Seems Headedfor Wide Use, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1991, at Al (interviewing individuals who are now using Norplant); MenstrualPatterns
in Women Using ContraceptiveImplants, Am. FAmi. PHYSICIAN, May 1991, at 1826 [hereinafter
Menstrual Patterns] (discussing unusual menstrual patterns among Norplant users); and
Norplant: Satisfaction and Side-Effects, SPECIAL DELIVERY, Summer 1991, at 3 [hereinafter
Satisfaction and Side-Effects] (discussing side-effects exhibited by and satisfaction of Norplant
users). The textual discussion of Norplant which follows is drawn primarily from these sources.
24. Segal, supra note 23, at 9.
25. See id. at ii.
26. Id.
27. See Lewin, supra note 23, at Al.
28. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 103. An average of 50 to 80 micrograms of
levenorgestrel is released daily into the blood stream during the first year of use. Id. This level
decreases to between 30 and 50 micrograms a day over the remaining four years. Id.
29. Segal, supra note 23, at 11. One woman compared the soreness in her arm the day
after she had the device implanted to the pain she feels after having worked out too much.
Lewin, supra note 23, at Al.
30. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 103.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

efficiency in preventing conception approaches that of sterilization.3 1
According to various studies, the pregnancy rate for Norplant users
is between .2 and .6 per 100 women during the first year.3 The rate
rises to 1.5 pregnancies per 100 women per year at the end of five
years. For comparison, oral contraceptives have a typical pregnancy
rate of 3 per 100 users per year, and condoms without spermicide
have an annual pregnancy rate of 12 per 100 users.- Although highly
effective when in use, Norplant is reversible and fertility returns
within months after its removal.Because Norplant uses a low dose hormone, side effects which
plague certain forms of the pill are rare. 36 One side effect, however,
is common among Norplant users: abnormal menstrual patterns and
bleeding. 37 In one study, eighty-four percent of the women using
Norplant reported menstrual changes including irregular and prolonged bleeding in their first year.: These numbers drop significantly,
however, by the fourth and fifth years of use. 39
Although it is an attractive device, not every woman can use
Norplant.40 The device is less effective in women weighing over 154
pounds. 4' Women suffering from liver disease, breast cancer, or blood

31. Segal, supra note 23, at 9-10. Even sterilization in both males and females is not
completely effective. See id. The typical pregnancy rate is .15 per 100 women during the first
year after male sterilization. Id. at 10. When the female is sterilized, the pregnancy rate is
typically .4 per 100 women during the first year. Id.
32. Compare id. at 10 with Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 104.
33. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 104.
34. See Segal, supra note 23, at 10, tbl.
35. See Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 104. When attempting pregnancy after the
removal of Norplant, 20% of the women are pregnant within a month; 49% by the fourth month;
73% by the sixth month; and 86% by the end of the first year. Id.
36. See id. at 105. Some of the less common side effects of Norplant are weight gain or
loss, nausea, headache, nervousness, acne, depression, and anemia. Id.
37. Id. at 104; Menstrual Patterns, supra note 23, at 1826; Satisfaction and Side-Effects,
supra note 23, at 3; Segal, supra note 23, at 10.
38. Satisfaction and Side-Effects, supra note 23, at 3. The study included interviews of
200 women in clinical trials in San Francisco in 1988. Id. Another study conducted by Shoupe
et al., is discussed in Menstrual Patterns, supra note 23, at 1826.
39. Menstrual Patterns, supra note 23, at 1826. In one study, only 37.5% of the women
still using Norplant during the fifth year reported irregular bleeding cycles. Id.
40. See Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 104.
41. Id. In women weighing over 154 pounds, Norplant's effectiveness in preventing conception drops to about 1 pregnancy per 100 users in the second year, 4 pregnancies per 100 users
by the third year, and 7 pregnancies per 100 users by the fifth year. Id.
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clots in the legs or lungs should not use the implant at all. 42 Moreover,
women who have heart problems or diabetes are warned away from
Norplant.4 3 Finally, Norplant's cost may be prohibitive for some
women. While physician fees vary, the device itself costs $350;" and
the total cost for using Norplant may be as much as $600. 45 Still, this
46
is less than the cost of oral contraceptives over a five-year period.
Despite its drawbacks, Norplant has been well received by American women. 47 By the end of November 1991, 100,000 women in the
United States were using Norplant." About sixty to sixty-five percent
of the women who have tried Norplant continue to use it for more
than two years. 49 In comparison, fifty percent of those taking oral
contraceptives stop using them after the first yearY° Many women
endure the irregular bleeding and continue to use Norplant because
it is easy to use and reversible.51 Indeed, it is because Norplant does
not require the patient's cooperation to be effective that some people
view its use as an attractive solution to the problem of child abuse.52
II.

THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE AND ITS LIMITS

As noted earlier, critics argue Judge Broadman's Norplant sentence
violates Darlene Johnson's right to procreate.0 These critics claim the
Constitution implicitly protects a person's right to conceive a child.5
The Supreme Court, however, has never decided a case based on this
right. Instead, the right to procreate relies on dicta in several of the
Court's contraception cases. To evaluate the validity of a Norplant
probation condition, it is necessary to first sketch how the Court has
defined the right to procreate and to what extent this right protects
a person's freedom to conceive a child.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Segal, supra note 23, at 11.
Findlay, supra note 1, at 59.
Segal, supra note 23, at 11.
Findlay, supra note 1, at 60.
Id. One source states that the pill would cost between $200 and $250 per year. Id.
See Lewin, supra note 23, at Al.
Id.
Segal, supra note 23, at 11.
Flattum-Riemers, supra note 23, at 104. This statistic is based on international studies.

51.
52.
53.
54.

See Lewin, supra note 23, at Al.
See Denmark, supra note 5, at 23.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 5.

Id.
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The Right to Procreatein Supreme Court Cases

The Court first articulated the right to procreate in the 1942 case,
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Willamson.55 In Skinner, the Court
struck down Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.5 6 Under
this Act, the state could sterilize persons convicted two or more times
of crimes "involving moral turpitude. 157 The Act excepted, however,
violations of the prohibatory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, and
political offenses.-8 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas,
reasoned that because the Act treated certain crimes differently from
others, the law laid "an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense." 59 Therefore, the Court held
that the Act was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.6
While the Court's decision rested on the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice Douglas characterized the case as involving "a right which is
basic to the perpetuation of a race - the right to have offspring." 61
Later, Justice Douglas claimed that marriage and procreation were
among the "basic civil rights of man."' Although only dicta, Justice
Douglas' words in Skinner supported the Court's later statements
regarding the right to procreate.

55. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56. Id. at 538. Under the Act, males were to be sterilized by a vasectomy and females by
a salpingectomy. Id. at 537.
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 537.
59. Id. at 541. The petitioner in this case was convicted once of stealing chickens and twice
of armed robbery. Id. at 537. Following his second armed robbery conviction, the state sought
to have him sterilized under the Act. Id. Justice Douglas illustrated the constitutional infirmity
of the Act by noting that under the Oklahoma law:
A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a felony; and he
may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of the property
and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an embezzler. Hence no matter how habitual
his proclivities for embezzlement are and no matter how often his conviction, he
may not be sterilized. Thus the nature of the two crimes is intrinsically the same
and they are punishable in the same manner.
Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 541-42.
61. Id. at 536.
62. Id. at 541. Under international law, the right to procreate is considered a human right.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ait. 16, § I, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/811
(1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21, 24 (I. Brownlie ed., 2d ed.,
1981) ("Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry and to found a family.").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss3/7

8

Taylor: Court-Ordered Contraception: Norplant as a Probation Condition in
COURT-ORDERED CONTRACEPTION - NORPLANT

In 1965, the Court decided the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut.0 In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples.6 In doing
so, the Court held the Constitution protected a right to privacy.6
While Griswold does not specifically address the right to procreate,
the issue in Griswold - whether a married couple has the freedom
to use contraception - is related to such a right.6 If the right to
privacy protects a married couple's freedom to use contraception, then
the same right to privacy protects a couple's decision not to use contraception and to conceive a child. 67 In this fashion, the Griswold Court

63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Id. at 485.
65. Id. at 484-85. Although Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, only three
other Justices, Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan, joined in his opinion. Id. at 486. Justice Douglas
argued that the rights listed in the Bill of Rights had "penumbras" which encompass a right to
privacy. Id. at 484-86. Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in which he grounded the
right to privacy in the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 490-91 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justices
Warren and Brennan joined Justice Goldberg's opinion. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
Justices Harlan and White filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring);
id. at 502 (White, J., concurring). Justices Black and Stewart joined each other's dissenting
opinions. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In his Griswold concurrence, Justice
Goldberg addressed the issue which is the topic of this note. In answering the arguments of
the Griswold dissenters, Justice Goldberg stated:
The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or state legislation that seems to
me even more plainly unconstitutional than the statute before us., Surely the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not
decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been
born to them. Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would
not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no
provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing
the marital right to bear children and raise a family. While it may shock some of
my Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right
of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such
totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law
outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid.
In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights
of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.
Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
67. Id.
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linked the right to procreate to the broader constitutional right to
privacy.6
In the 1972 case of Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 the Court again confronted a state law restricting access to contraception.70 The Massachusetts statute in Eisenstadt mandated that only married couples
could obtain contraceptives for the sole purpose of preventing pregnancy. 71 Single persons could procure contraceptives, but only to protect against disease, not to prevent pregnancy. 2 To the Court, this
disparate treatment of married and single persons appeared to violate
the Equal Protection Clause and therefore the Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional.73
Like Skinner, Eisenstadt was an equal protection case.7 4 Justice
Brennan's opinion for thd Court, however, contained forceful dicta on
the right to procreate. While the Griswold decision framed the right
to privacy in the context of a marital relationship, 76 in Eisenstadt,
Justice Brennan argued that this was an individual right.77 Marriage,
according to Justice Brennan, was "an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. ' 7 Accordingly, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
79
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

68. James Bolner & Robert Jacobsen, The Right to Procreate:The Dilemma of Overpopulation and the United States Judiciary, 25 Loy. L. REv. 235, 250-51 (1979).
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. Id. at 440-42.
71. Id. at 441-42.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 454-55.
74. Id.; see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
75. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
76. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
77. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.

78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Brennan cited three cases in support of this statement. Id. at 453-54. In
addition to Skinner, Justice Brennan cited Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) and Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In Stanley, the Court struck down, as violative of the
First Amendment, a Georgia law making it crime for an individual to possess obscene material
in his own home. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568; see id. at 558-59, n.1 (text of Georgia law). In
Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan noted this language from Stanley:
[A]lso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.
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In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan refined the right to procreate in
8
two respects. First, procreation means "to bear or beget a child." O
Second, single persons as well as married couples enjoy this right.,,
Because of Justice Brennan's statement, Eisenstadtstands as the landmark case in defining the right to procreate.
Justice Brennan revisited his Eisenstadt statement in the 1977
case, Carey v. Population Services International.2 In Carey, the
Court reviewed a New York statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen and mandating that only
licensed pharmacists could sell contraceptives.Y The Court struck down
these provisions because they unduly burdened the right to privacy.Y

'The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness ....
They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized man."
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 n.10 (first alteration in original) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
In Jacobson, the Court upheld a Massachusetts law allowing municipalities to order the
vaccination of inhabitants against diseases when deemed necessary to protect public health.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12, 39. In doing so, the Court noted that "[tihere is, of course, a sphere
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government, especially of any free government existing under a written
constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will." Id. at 29.
80. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
81. See id.
82. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
83. Id. at 681.
84. Id. at 691. Regarding the provision limiting distribution of contraceptives to licensed
pharmacists, the Court argued this "clearly imposes a significant burden on the right of the
individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to do so." Id. at 689. The Court concluded the
state could not justify this invasion of a fundamental right. See id. at 691. In striking down the
prohibition of the sale of contraceptives to minors, the Court was less united. Only Justices
Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's opinion on this point. Id. at 691 n.12.
Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment of the Court. Id.
at 703 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 712 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White concurred in
part and concurred in the result reached in regard to the prohibition on the sale of contraceptives
to minors. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring). Thus, while seven Justices voted to strike down
the three provisions of the New York statute, there was no majority reasoning for invalidating
the prohibition on the sale to minors.
A third provision in the statute prohibited advertising contraceptives. Id. at 681. The Court
reasoned that although the advertisement and display of contraceptives was commercial speech,
it was protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 700. Accordingly, this provision was also
unconstitutional. Id.
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In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan reasoned that "decisions
whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most
private and sensitive."8 Justice Brennan reiterated that Eisenstadt
protected an individual's decision to bear or beget a child.- Justice
Brennan concluded: "Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in mat's7
ters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.
Thus, the right to procreate, which Justice Douglas first articulated
in Skinner, finds its fullest expression in Justice Brennan's opinions
in Carey and Eisenstadt. None of these cases, however, dealt directly
with the right to conceive a child. As noted earlier, Skinner and
Eisenstadt were equal protection cases.- Griswold and Carey, while
addressing more directly the right to privacy, did so in the context
of state restrictions on access to contraception. s9 While Justice Brennan's language in Eisenstadt and Carey seems plain enough, the limits
on the right to procreate, particularly the right to conceive a child,
are not well defined.
B.

Limits on the Right to Procreate

Since the Court has only spelled out a right to procreate in dicta,
predicting how the Court would decide a case turning upon the right
to conceive a child is a troublesome task.9 1 Nonetheless, the Court's

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 685.
Id. at 687.
Id.
See supra notes 60, 74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64, 83 and accompanying text.
Gayle Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits of Choice, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 12, 24 (1988-89) (noting that the right to procreate is weakly grounded
in constitutional dicta); Roberts, supra note 15, at 1466 n.231; John A. Robertson, Procreative
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 415
(1983) (arguing that "except for Skinner v. Oklahoma, which examines involuntary sterilization
in an equal protection context, none of the Court's cases asserting a right to procreate directly
address restrictions on reproduction or questions of genetic transfer and gestation"); see Note,
Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856,
1883-84 (1971).
91. Some commentators contend that the current conservative majority on the Court is
hostile to the right to privacy in the area of reproductive freedom. See Rhonda Copelon, Losing
the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive Freedom, in WOMEN AND
THE LAW 10E-1 (Carol H. Lefcourt ed., 1984). Professor Copelon goes so far as to state that
"[i]t is highly unlikely that the Constitution will be a source of protection for reproductive and
sexual rights for many years to come, unless the devastating impact of the Court's cutbacks on
these rights ... generates a sufficiently powerful movement to turn the Court around." Id. at
10E-31.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss3/7

12

Taylor: Court-Ordered Contraception: Norplant as a Probation Condition in
COURT-ORDERED CONTRACEPTION - NORPLANT

language in Carey and Eisenstadt is definitive enough to conclude that
the Constitution protects a right to conceive a child.92 In Eisenstadt,
Justice Brennan stated the right to privacy protects an individual's
decision to "bear or beget" a child.9 As these terms are normally
used, this includes the right to conceive a child.- Some commentators,
however, believe this right may be circumscribed by two conditions:
marriage and adulthood.
Several authors have argued the right to procreate is limited to
the marital relationship. 95 Single persons, while enjoying the same

rights as married couples to use contraceptives and obtain abortions,
do not have a coextensive right to procreate.9 This is because the

92.

See Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 687; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453;

AM1ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

LAURENCE

H. TRIBE,

1339-40 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the Court's decisions

in Griswold and Skinner stand for the rule that "whether one person's body shall be the source
of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to decide") (footnote omitted);
Robertson, supranote 90, at 416 (arguing that the right to procreate can be inferred from the
Court's decisions in the contraceptive cases). But see Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus
of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests,
81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 530-31 (1983). Professor Hafen argues that the contraceptive cases Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey - cannot be stretched to find a broad "right of procreative
autonomy." Id. at 531. The only laws addressed in these cases were laws restricting a person's
right to prevent conception, and nothing more. Id. Professor Hafen notes that while Skinner
addressed a person's "ability to cause conception," it did so in the context of permanent sterilization. Id. Thus, the Court's decision merely "preserved Skinners reproductive capacity" without
articulating a more general right to procreate. See id.
93. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
94. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966). As defined by Webster's,
"bear" means 'to give birth to," id. at 191, and "beget" means 'to procreate as the father," id.
at 198.
95. Hafen, supra note 92, at 537; Robertson, supra note 90, at 417-18; see J. Harvie
Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 579 (1977).
96. See Robertson, supra note 90, at 417. Professor Robertson contends that one can derive
a right to procreate for married couples, but not single persons, from cases recognizing a right
not to conceive or bear children and from cases finding a right to rear children. Id. According
to Robertson:
The distinctions between avoiding procreation and procreating ...serve no purpose
when applied to married persons ... because those activities fall within the scope
of the familial autonomy traditionally extended to married couples. The distinctions
are more tenable when they are applied to . . .single persons, because the legal
protection of decisions to conceive and bear a child has traditionally been confined
to marriage. Although denying unmarried persons the freedom to avoid procreation
by denying them contraceptives and abortions may be wrong because that would
impose physical burdens on them, forbidding them to procreate outside of marriage
would not impose such burdens.
Id. at 417-18.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Court has protected the right to procreate - to conceive and raise a
child - as part of an over-arching right to privacy grounded in the
familial relationship.97 Because single persons "do not live in recognized
'
intimate relationships,"98
they do not have a right to procreate.99
This argument, however, ignores Justice Brennan's clear statement
in Eisenstadt.'- According to Justice, Brennan, the right to privacy
includes "the right of the individual, married or single" to decide
whether to "bear or beget a child."11 Moreover, the Court has recognized that the same privacy right protects a single person's decision
to have an abortion or use contraception.102 Consequently, the Court
would likely hold that a single person has the same right to conceive
a child as a married couple does.' 3

97. Id. at 418; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 491 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
98. Hafen, supra note 92, at 537.
99. Id. Professor Hafen argues that "[i]t is one thing to protect permanent procreative
capacity as Skinner does. But it is quite another to speak of 'procreation choices' for unmarried
persons and promiscuous teenagers." Id. "
100. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. See id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
103. Even Professor Robertson admits that he could make a "strong argument" for extending
the right to procreate to single persons as well. Robertson, supra note 90, at 418. Professor
Tribe comments that "[olne cannot avoid the conclusion that the stereotypical 'family unit' that is
so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional
reality." TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1416-17.
It should be noted, however, that the right to procreate outside of marriage may be legally
foreclosed, in most circumstances, by state laws which prohibit fornication and adultery. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1975) (adultery); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-18, -19 (Michie 1982 &
Supp. 1 1991) (fornication and adultery); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 11-7, -8 (Smith-Hurd
1991) (adultery and fornication); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 14, 18 (West 1991) (adultery
and fornication); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991) (fornication). The
constitutionality of these statutes appears secure. John A. Robertson, The Right to Procreate
and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 340 (1982). In his dissenting opinion in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice Harlan wrote, "I would not suggest that adultery,
homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry." Poe, 367 U.S. at 552
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In his Griswold concurrence (joined by Justices Warren and Brennan),
Justice Goldberg remarked that the constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes forbidding fornication and adultery was "beyond doubt." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a
Georgia statute which criminalized sodomy even when practiced by consenting adults).
As one commentator has noted, however, these statutes are honored more in the breach
than in the observance. See Note, Fornication, Cohabitation,and the Constitution, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 253, 254 (1978).
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Adolescents, however, may not enjoy the same right to procreate
as adults. 104 In Carey, the Court confronted, and ultimately struck
down, New York's prohibition'0 5 on the sale of contraceptives to
minors.' ° Yet Carey did not produce an exact standard for evaluating
state restrictions on a minor's right to privacy and procreation. Justice
Brennan, joined by three other Justices, argued that a state may
burden a minor's right to privacy if there is a "significant state interest
...that is not present in the case of an adult.' 10 7 In most cases, the
Court requires that a statute restricting a person's constitutional rights
be narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest.' °0 Compared
to the traditional "compelling interest" standard, Justice Brennan's
"significant interest" standard is an easier requirement for the state
to meet.' °9
Although Justice Powell concurred in the Carey judgment, he
criticized Justice Brennan's ambiguous "significant interest" standard." 0 Arguing that states have "broad latitude to legislate with respect to adolescents,""' Justice Powell concluded that a state only has
to show that a restriction on a minor's right to privacy was rationally

related to a valid state interest.12 While the resulting standard is

104. See Hafen, supra note 92, at 537; Robertson, supra note 103, at 340.
105. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681 n.1, for the exact wording of the New York statute. This
statute included an apparent exception for distribution of contraceptives by physicians in the
course of their practice. See id. at 691-99.
106. Id. at 681-82. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun,
found this provision unconstitutional. See id. at 691-99. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens
joined in this result, but filed separate opinions containing different rationale. See id. at 702-17
(White, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring). Thus, seven of the nine Justices voted to strike down
the provision prohibiting sales of contraceptives to minors.
107. Id. at 693 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)).
108. Id. at 686.
109. Id. at 693 n.15. In this footnote, Justice Brennan provided two rationales for this less
demanding standard. See id. First, states have greater latitude in regulating the conduct of
children. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968)). Second, the right of privacy implicated here involves the interest in making
"certain kinds of important decisions," and the law has generally regarded minors as less capable
than adults in making such decisions. Id. (citing Danforth,428 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
110. Carey, 431 U.S. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring). Under the rational relation standard, a state must
only prove that its action is rationally related to a valid state interest. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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unclear, five Justices in Carey agreed that a state does not have to
meet the rigorous "compelling interest" standard to restrict a minor's
right to privacy. Therefore, the Court would probably allow greater
restriction on a minor's right to conceive a child than it would on an
3
adult's right."1
Thus, while the Court has recognized a right to conceive a child,
it is not a well-defined right. The right exists for both single and
married persons.1 4 Minors, however, may not have as much freedom
to conceive a child as do adults."1 5 Moreover, no right is absolute.116
A state may restrict a fundamental right if the state has a "compelling
interest" and the restriction is narrowly-tailored to serve that in7
terest."1
In Darlene Johnson's case, having Norplant implanted for three
years would preclude any decision by her to conceive a child during
that period." 8 This significantly burdens her right to procreate."19 If
Johnson were a minor, then under Carey, Judge Broadman would
have an easier time justifying this condition.' 20 Johnson, however, is
an adult and therefore should be afforded the protection of the "compelling interest" standard. 21 In practice, the test which courts have
fashioned for evaluating probation conditions impinging upon constitutional rights parallels the "compelling interest" standard.'2 Moreover,
any probation condition, whether or not it burdens a constitutional
right, must be reasonably related to the goals of probation.1'2
III.

PROBATION CONDITIONS

Though probation can take many forms, it has "three characteristic
elements: (1) release of the offender into the community (2) with certain

11g. See supra notes 107, 112 and accompanying text.
114. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
115. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
116. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
117. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
118. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
119. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
120. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. In a 1969 article in the American Bar
Association Journal, three authors suggested that courts had sufficient authority to order promiscuous teenagers to use contraception in order to prevent future pregnancies. See Don J.
Young et al., Court-Ordered Contraception, 55 A.B.A. J. 223, 223-26 (1969). The article drew
critical fire from other commentators. See Note, Court-OrderedContraception - A Reasonable
Alternative to Institutionalizationfor Juvenile Unwed Mothers, 1970 WIs. L. REV. 899.
121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text
122. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
123. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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conditions imposed upon him (3) under the supervision of the probation
1
department."'1' Judges generally impose probation in lieu of jail time. 2
In this sense, it is seen as a more lenient sentence. 26 Because probation
is a statutory construct, judges in all fifty states and the federal
system rely upon probation statutes to guide their sentencing.1 Both
statutes and case law identify two goals' of probation: rehabilitation
of the offendeim and protection of society against future harm.130 To
accomplish these goals, judges normally have broad authority under
3
the statutes to fashion conditions to fit the needs of specific cases.' '

124. Richard Gray, Probation:An Explorationin Meaning, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1986,
at 26, 27.
125. NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 4
(1983). A short jail term may also be included as a condition of an offender's probation. Id.
126. See id. at 23.
127. See id. at 6-8, 32-33.
128. Some commentators argue a third goal - punishment - is implicit in certain probationary conditions. See Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A CriticalAnalysis
of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1359-68 (arguing that certain "scarlet
letter" conditions cross the line from rehabilitation to punishment); Leonore H. Tavill, Note,
Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's Probation Condition, 36
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 632-33 (1988) (noting that some courts have considered whether conditions of probation may constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
Courts are divided on the issue. Compare Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th
Cir. 1945) (stating that "[clonditions of probation are not punitive in character") with Cooper v.
United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937) (stating that probation is a mild form of punishment) and Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D. Colo. 1970) (noting that probation
contains punitive elements). See also In re Buehrer, 236 A.2d 592, 596 (N.J. 1967) (stating that
"[p]robation has an inherent sting, and restrictions upon the freedom of the probationer are
realistically punitive in quality").
129. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 895 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(c) (Anderson 1991);
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Keller, 143
Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1978); Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978).
130. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2951.02(a) (Anderson 1991); Higdon, 627 F.2d 893; United States v. Graham, 575 F.2d
739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); Malone v. United States, "502 F.2d 554 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979); State
v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69 (La. 1979).
131. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (1991) (stating that courts may impose
such terms and conditions "as the law requires and the court deems appropriate"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.021 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1992) ('The conditions of probation shall be such as the
court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will not again
violate the law."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.1853(1) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991) ("In issuing
an order granting probation, the court may fix the terms and conditions thereof. . . ."). See
also Burns, 287 U.S. at 220 (finding that courts have broad authority to impose conditions);
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Historically, probationers rarely challenged the conditions of their
release.132 In part, offenders were so pleased to avoid jail, they did
not think to question their probation conditions.- More importantly,
three judicial theories protected trial judges and prosecutors from
appellate challenges to probation conditions. Under the "act of grace"
theory, probation was viewed as a privilege which the state could
withhold from the offender.- Thus, the state could attach whatever
conditions it desired to the offender's release.'15 Under the "contract/
waiver" theory, probationers could not challenge conditions to which
they had "voluntarily" agreed when accepting probation in lieu of
jail. 136 Finally, under the "constructive custody" theory, probationers
enjoyed no more liberty than they would have enjoyed had they been
incarcerated.137 However, courts and commentators have thoroughly
M

United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that judges have flexibility
in imposing probationary terms); Louis K. Polonsky, Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 GA. L. REV. 466, 467 (explaining that trial
judges traditionally have been allowed "broad discretion" in imposing probationary conditions).
132. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 207-08.
133. See id.
134. The origins of this theory lie in the Supreme Court's case of Escoe v. Zerbst, 295
U.S. 490 (1935). In Escoe, the Court stated that "[p]robation ...
comes as an act of grace to
one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as
Congress may impose." Id. at 492-93. The broader rationale behind this doctrine is that anyone
who seeks benefits bestowed by the government must submit to any terms the government
deems desirable. Note, Judicial Review of ProbationConditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190
(1967). The assumption is that the government's right to withhold the benefit entirely necessarily
encompasses the power to grant the benefit conditionally. Id. Accordingly, the citizens' inability
to force the government to give them the benefit unconditionally likewise precludes the right
to challenge the conditions on which the benefit is offered. Id.
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Lee v. Superior Court, 201 P.2d 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); State v.
Smith, 62 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1950). This theory views probation as a contractual relationship
between the court and the offender. Note, supra note 134, at 191. The court agrees to release
the offender, and the offender agrees in return to submit to the court's conditions. Id. Thus,
by agreeing to the conditions, the offender has waived any right to later challenge them in
court. Id.
137. For cases describing this theory in the context of parolees, see, e.g., Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); People v. Hernandez, 40 Cal. Rptr.
100, 101 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); and People v. Denne,
297 P.2d 451, 456 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). Under this approach, the court could impose
conditions which dramatically restricted the probationer's liberties. Because the Court could
have sentenced the probationer to prison, it necessarily has the power to restrict the probationer's
liberties up to a point similar to the restrictions found in the prison environment.
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discredited these three theories. 18 Today, two factors limit the discretion trial judges have in fashioning probation terms: the "reasonableness" requirement and the Constitution.
A.

Reasonableness

As noted above, the goals of probation are to rehabilitate the
offender and to protect society against future harm. 139 As a general
rule, probationary conditions must be reasonably related to these
goals. 1°0 The source of the reasonableness requirement varies among
jurisdictions. Several state statutes expressly require probation conditions to be reasonably related to the goals of probation.141 In other
14 2
jurisdictions, courts have read this requirement into the statutes.

138. The "act of grace" theory was finally rejected by the Supreme Court in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973). Both courts and commentators argue the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), implicitly rejected the "contract"
theory as well. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975);
Bruce D. Greenberg, ProbationConditions and the FirstAmendment: When Reasonableness
Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45, 59 (1981); see The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 96 n.7 (1972). The primary fallacy of the "contract" theory was the
inequality of bargaining power between the court and the convicted. Note, supra note 134, at
192. A probationer, faced with a jail term, could hardly be said to have voluntarily assented to
the conditions of his release. Id. In these circumstances, the probationer's waiver of his right
to challenge his conditions is coerced, not voluntary. Id. But see Michael H. Shapiro, Forced
ContraceptionRaises Difficult Issues, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 19, 1991, at 7. Professor Shapiro,
in commenting on the Darlene Johnson case, counters:
Just because a decision is difficult doesn't mean that any given choice is "involuntary," coerced, or the product of undue influence. Where the difficult choice arises
out of constraints fairly imposed, . . . a flat refusal to honor such choices leaves
the decision makers - here, everyone at risk for incarceration - subject to state
fiat, with no choices at all except in minor matters.
Id.
The "constructive custody" theory, like the "contract" and "act of grace" theories, has been
dismissed by courts and commentators. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 n.15; see Comment,
FourthAmendment Rights of ProbationersandParolees,7 Wx. MITCHELL L. REv. 535, 544-46
(1981).

139. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
140. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 209.
141. See, e.g., ARK, CODE ANN. § 5-4-303(a) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 706-624(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
142. See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); Watson v. State, 301
A.2d 26, 31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976). Several
commentators claim the reasonableness requirement also is supported by the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. See James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation
Conditions, 8 NEw ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367, 371-73 (1982); Comment, supra note 138, at
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The Supreme Court has never defined a test for reasonableness in
probation conditions. Courts13 and commentators, 44 however, have
frequently cited the California case of People v. Dominguez- for the
standard to judge reasonableness. In Dominguez, the court reasoned:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality does
not serve the statutory ends of probation
146
and is invalid.
If a condition fails all three prongs of this test, then it is unreasonable
and therefore invalid.147 But if a condition meets just one prong of the
Dominguez test, then it is reasonable and valid.148 In addition, courts
also will find a probation condition unreasonable if it would be impossible or extremely difficult for a probationer to comply with it.149 In
one example, a court found that a condition which required the probationer, a hard-core alcoholic, to refrain from drinking, was unreason0
able. 15

543-44; Note, supra note 134, at 190-91. Under this approach, probation is considered a privilege
as under the "act of grace" theory. Weissman, supra, at 371. While the government has no
duty to grant such privileges, once it does so, constitutional protections attach. Comment, supra
note 138, at 543. As Justice Brennan wrote in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), "conditions
imposed upon the granting of privileges or gratuities must be 'reasonable."' Speiser, 357 U.S.
at 518. Thus, even if probation must be considered a privilege granted by the court, "this does
not give courts the power to arbitrarily condition the grant upon a waiver of constitutional
rights which is not reasonably related to the purposes of probation." Note, supra note 134, at 191.
143. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Livingston,
372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
144. See, e.g., COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 209; Tavill, supra note 128, at 622-23.
145. 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
146. Id. at 293 (construing then CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 which required that all conditions of probation be "reasonable"). Interestingly, Dominguez involved a probationary condition
similar to the one at issue in Darlene Johnson's case. See id. at 292. In Dominguez, the court
reviewed a condition which forbade the female probationer from having a child outside of marriage. Id. The probationer was convicted of robbery. Id. The court, applying its new test, found
the condition unreasonable. Id. at 293. The probationer's future pregnancy was unrelated to
the crime of robbery and any future criminality. Id. Moreover, having a child outside of marriage
was not in itself a crime. Id.
147. See id. at 293.
148. See id.
149. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 209-10.
150. Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965).
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B.

ConstitutionalLimits

To be valid, any probation condition must be reasonable.'91 But
when a condition burdens a constitutional right, courts go beyond the
152
reasonableness test in order to protect the rights of probationers.
The status of probationers makes them susceptible to restrictions on
their liberty from which other persons are free. 10 However, probationers are not devoid of constitutional rights.'-4
When confronted by a condition burdening a constitutional right,
courts will require the condition to be narrowly drawn to further the
legitimate goals of probation. ' This test parallels the "compelling
interest" standard the Supreme Court requires for statutes burdening
constitutional rights.156 Generally, courts will balance the right at issue
against the purpose the probation condition is to serve. 57 As part of
this inquiry, several courts have asked, either explicitly or implicitly,
whether there exists an alternative condition less restrictive of the
probationer's constitutional rights.as If such an alternative exists, then
it should be employed. 159 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez'6°:
Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable
constitutional rights may properly be subject to special
scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact
serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.

151. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
152. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1975).
153. Id. at 265; COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 213; see People v. Keller, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 191 (Ct. App. 1978).
154. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 264-65.
155. People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972);
COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 213.
156. Compare Mason, 488 P.2d at 635 with Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
686 (1977).
157. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 213; Polonsky, supra note 131, at 480; Weissman,
supra note 142, at 373.
158. For cases explicitly citing this requirement, see People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,
365 (Ct. App. 1984), and People v. Arvanites, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 500 (Ct. App. 1971). See also
Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980) ("If the impact of the conditions is
needlessly harsh, the conditions are impermissible."). For cases where this question is implicit
in the court's argument, see Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v.
Mosberg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
159. See supra note 158.
160. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
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But this is not to say that there is any presumption, however
weak, that such limitations are impermissible. Rather, it is
necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are
curbed it must be done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the broad purposes
of [probation].161
Thus, courts may, and have, successfully imposed conditions which

impinge upon the constitutional rights of probationers. 16
IV.

CASES PROHIBITING CONCEPTION OR PREGNANCY
AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

Although Judge Broadman is the first judge to specifically order
the use of Norplant, Darlene Johnson's case is not unique. In the past,
courts have tried to impose similar probation conditions on women
convicted of child abuse.16 In form, these conditions prohibited the
offenders from conceiving a child during the probationary period. 6
The courts, however, did not specify the use of a particular contraceptive.1 65 Three state appellate cases assessing the validity of this type
of condition illustrate the legal infirmities of a Norplant probation
condition.166 In each of these cases, an appellate court struck down a
T

161.

Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).

162. Courts have upheld numerous conditions impinging upon rights enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. For example, several courts have affirmed conditions restricting First Amendment
speech and association rights. See, e.g., United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977)
(upholding a condition requiring a probationer to associate only with law-abiding persons); Malone
v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a condition prohibiting probationer
from participating in American Irish Republican movement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975);
Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (issuing a permanent injunction restricting public speech); In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1971) (upholding a condition
prohibiting active participation in a demonstration). Probation conditions impinging upon the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures has also generated much
litigation. For commentary on this issue, see Sunny A.M. Kushy, Note, The Right of[All] the
People to Be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationersand
Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449 (1988); Comment, supra note 138.

163. See infra notes 172, 190, 213 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 172, 190, 213 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 172, 190, 213 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 168-225 and accompanying text. Other cases involving no-conception
or no-pregnancy conditions include State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
County, Sept. 2, 1988) (ordering probationer to use birth control for the rest of her life); Burchell
v. State, 419 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (invalidating a condition which prohibited a male
probationer from fathering a child); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
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condition prohibiting conception or pregnancy as being either unreasonable or unduly burdensome on the probationer's constitutional

rights.

1

6

A.

Rodriguez v. State

In 1979, a Florida appellate court reviewed a probation condition
which prohibited the probationer from becoming pregnant for ten
years. In Rodriguez v. State,'6 the defendant, Kathy Rodriguez,
pleaded nolo contendre to a charge of aggravated child abuse. 69 Rodriguez had hit her nine year-old child in the face and shoved the child
against an automobile.17 At the time, Rodriguez was experiencing
psychological and alcohol-induced problems."17 After her plea, the trial
court sentenced her to ten years of probation - under the conditions
that she not have custody of any children, marry without the court's
consent, or become pregnant."7 Rodriguez challenged the marriage
and pregnancy conditions as violating her constitutional rights.'3
The appellate court in Rodriguez ultimately struck down the marriage and pregnancy conditions. 74 The court began by noting, however,
that the constitutional rights of probationers may be limited in order
to further rehabilitation."75 Therefore, the court had "no constitutional
difficulty with the conditions imposed," so long as they were "otherwise
valid conditions of probation."176 Yet, after applying the Dominguez
test,"' the court concluded that the conditions were not reasonable. 7 8

(invalidating a condition which prohibited male probationer from fathering a child); State v.
Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (striking down a condition forbidding female
probationer from giving birth to children out of wedlock); and State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d
1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating a condition which prohibited female probationer from
having a child during five year probationary period). The Forstercase is commented upon in
Lipton & Campbell, supra note 22.
167. See infra notes 181, 209, 222 and accompanying text.
168. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
169. Id. at 8.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id.
177. See text accompanying supra note 146.
178. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9-10.
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Marriage and pregnancy were unrelated to the crime of child abuse
and were not in themselves criminal acts.'179 Although the conditions
could relate to future criminality, they were unnecessary because the
probationer could not have custody of any children.'- Hence, the Rodriguez court found the marriage and no-pregnancy conditions unreasonable and therefore invalid.,,,
B.

People v. Pointer

Like the Rodriguez court, a California appellate court in the 1984
case of People v. Pointer8 2 reviewed a probation condition prohibiting
a woman from conceiving a child.- In Pointer, the defendant, Ruby
Pointer, was convicted of child endangerment.'8 Pointer strictly
adhered to a rigorous macrobiotic diet.'- She imposed this diet on her
two sons - ages two and four at the time of the trial - over the
objections of their father and several doctors.186 As a result of this
diet, the children became critically malnourished.- Her older son was
seriously underdeveloped and the diet reduced her two-year old to an
emaciated, semicomatose state which left him with permanent
neurological damage. 188 Upon her conviction, the trial court sentenced
her to five years on probation.189 As a condition of probation, the court

179. Id. at 10.
180. Id. Although the court earlier dismissed constitutional limitations on the no-conception
condition, this argument parallels the constitutional test courts apply to probation conditions.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text. The Rodriguez court implied that the condition
preventing conception was invalid because a less restrictive alternative - removing any child
from Rodriguez's custody after birth - was available. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10. The
requirement that no "less restrictive alternative" exist is a constitutional limitation on probation
conditions affecting constitutional rights. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
181. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
182. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
183. Id. at 359.
184. Id.
185. Id. A macrobiotic diet consists almost entirely of grains, beans, and vegetables. Id.
at 359 n.2. Such a diet de-emphasizes milk products in all forms, and excludes fish, meat,
poultry, and eggs. Id.
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id. at 359-60.
188. Id. at 360.
189. Id. Pointer also was prohibited from having custody of any children without court
approval during the probationary period. Id.
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prohibited her from conceiving a child during the probation period. 190
Pointer challenged this condition as an unconstitutional restriction of
her right to procreate. 191
The appellate court in Pointer evaluated the condition in light of
the reasonableness test and the constitutional right to procreate. The
court concluded the condition was reasonable. 192 Citing the Dominguez
test, the Pointer court held that Pointer's future pregnancy was related to future criminality.0 3 Should she become pregnant, Pointer's
devotion to a macrobiotic diet could harm a fetus in utero.0 3 Consequently, the no-conception condition was related to future criminality
and thus satisfied Dominguez's third prong.1 95 Finding this condition
reasonable, the court next considered the condition's impact on
1 96
Pointer's right to procreate.
Citing Griswold 97 and Roe v. Wade,198 the court concluded that the
condition prohibiting conception burdened the exercise of "a fundamen20
tal right to privacy."1 99 The court, relying on Consuelo-Gonzalez,'
2
subjected the probation condition to special scrutiny. 01 The test the
court applied questioned whether the condition was narrowly-drawn
so that there were no alternatives less restrictive of the constitutional
right.2 The court reasoned that the no-conception condition was not
rehabilitative, but instead was intended to protect against future criminality.20 The court struck down the condition because a less restrictive

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 364.
193. Id.
194. Id. In this manner, the court distinguished the instant case from Rodriguez and State
v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976), another case involving a no-conception
condition. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364. In the court's analysis, these cases relied considerably
upon the fact that the abuse could be prevented entirely by removing any children from the
custody of the defendant. Id. Given Pointer's strict adherence to a macrobiotic diet, however,
action after birth would not prevent in utero harm to the child caused by Pointer's diet. See id.
195. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
196. Id.
197. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
198. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
199. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65 (citations omitted).
200. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
201. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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alternative could achieve this goal. 2 According to the court, the state
could monitor Pointer's health during probation.25 If she became pregnant, the state could require her to undergo intensive prenatal and
neonatal care. 2 6 After birth, the state could remove the child from
Pointer's custody if necessary to protect the child. 20 7 Because this
alternative respected Pointer's right to procreate, the no-conception
condition unnecessarily burdened Pointer's constitutional right.2 As
a result, the court held that the no-conception condition was invalid.C.

State v. Mosberg

In 1989, a Kansas court reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Mosberg.210 In Mosberg, Diana Mosberg pleaded no contest to a charge
of child endangerment. 2 1 Mosberg had given birth to a baby girl and
two hours later abandoned the baby in a stranger's truck. 212 The trial
court placed Mosberg on two years probation - with one of the conditions being that she not become pregnant during the probation
period. 213 On appeal, Mosberg challenged the constitutionality of this
14
no-pregnancy condition.2

204. Id. at 366. The court also noted two other problems created by the no-conception
condition. Id. at 362, 366. First, it would be difficult to monitor and supervise Pointer's use of
contraception. Id. at 362. Second, such a condition might force Pointer to have an abortion to
cover up a pregnancy. Id. at 366. Indeed, the trial judge warned: "If she violates probation in
this case, I would be sending her to prison; I can assure you of that. I expect her to live up
to every single, solitary term and condition of probation." Id. (quoting the trial judge, Christopher
C. Cottle). The appellate court reasoned that such a "stern admonition" made it clear to Pointer
that if she did become pregnant, the only way to avoid jail would be to get an abortion. Id.
Such a condition would be "coercive of abortion" and therefore "improper." Id. The appellate
court further reasoned: "Less restrictive conditions aimed at protecting the child in utero and
after birth would not so clearly induce resistance to the disclosure of pregnancy. To this extent,
less restrictive alternative conditions would be easier to monitor and enforce ....
" Id.
205. Id. at 365. The court brushed aside the state's argument that the local children's
protective services agency did not have the resources to provide for such intensive monitoring
Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 366.
209. Id.
210. 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
211. Id. at 313.
212. Id. at 313-14.
213. Id. at 314.
214. Id.
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The appellate court in Mosberg noted that while trial courts have
broad powers in fashioning probation conditions, there were limits on
conditions which burdened constitutional rights. 215 The court quoted
2 16
extensively from Carey to establish Mosberg's right to procreate.
Relying on the reasoning of Pointerand Rodriguez, the Mosberg court
concluded that the no-pregnancy condition "unduly intrudes on Mosberg's right to privacy.12 17 The court further concluded that there
would be "significant enforcement problems" with the no-pregnancy
condition.2 18 The state, according to the court, "should not have the
power to penalize Mosberg if she uses contraceptives which for some
reason fail to prevent pregnancy. ' 219 Moreover, should Mosberg become pregnant, the probation condition would force her to choose
between concealing her pregnancy, abortion, or incarceration.220 For
the court, such a choice was unacceptable.Y Accordingly, the court
struck down the probation condition prohibiting pregnancy.2
Although neither Rodriguez, Pointer, nor Mosberg involved
Norplant, the conditions at issue in those cases are in form the same
as the Norplant condition in the Johnson case.22 Using Norplant for
three years would prevent Johnson from conceiving a child and becoming pregnant for the entire three year period.- This was Judge Broadman's intent when he imposed the sentence.m Therefore, the decisions
in Rodriguez, Pointer, and Mosberg suggest that Judge Broadman's
Norplant condition is, like the no-conception/no-pregnancy conditions,
invalid.

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 315.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Here, the Mosberg court echoed a concern voiced earlier by the court in Pointer.
See supra note 204.
221. Mosberg, 768 P.2d at 315.
222. Id.
223. Compare Mosberg, 768 P.2d at 314 (no-pregnancy condition) and Pointer, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 359 (no-conception condition) and Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 8 (no-pregnancy condition)
with supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (summarizing how Norplant prevents pregnancy).
224. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
225. See Lev, supra note 6, at A17.
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REASONABLENESS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
NORPLANT CONDITION

A. Reasonableness
Assessing the reasonableness of a Norplant condition depends upon
the particular facts of a case.- 6 In a typical child abuse case like
Darlene Johnson's, where the abuse occurs after birth, a Norplant
condition does not pass the Dominguez test. Yet in cases where the
mother abuses drugs while pregnant, a Norplant condition may be
reasonable. Even in drug abuse cases, however, a Norplant condition
may be unreasonable if the woman cannot use the device for health
reasons.
In typical child-abuse cases (where the abuse occurs post-birth), a
Norplant condition fails all three prongs of the Dominguez test.
According to Rodriguez, a condition prohibiting pregnancy is not related to the crime of child abuse.: Like Darlene Johnson, the defendants in Rodriguez, Mosberg, and Pointerwere convicted for abusive
acts occurring after conception and pregnancy.- 9 A Norplant condition,
however, focuses on preventing conception and pregnancy.- 0 Johnson
was not convicted for conceiving and bearing a child but, instead, for
beating her children after they were born.-, Thus, a Norplant condition
is not related to the crime. Moreover, the Norplant condition does
not prevent conduct which is itself criminal. Conceiving a child and
being pregnant are not crimes in our society. 3 2 Therefore, in a typical
child-abuse case, a Norplant condition fails the first two prongs of the
Dominguez test.
At first glance, a Norplant condition appears to satisfy Dominguez's
third prong: a probation condition which is related to future criminality.2* If child abusers cannot conceive a child, then it is less likely

226. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967).
227. See id. at 293.
228. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
229. See id. at 8; Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60; Mosberg, 768 P.2d at 314; Lev, supra
note 6, at A17.
230. See Lev, supra note 6, at A17.
231. Id.
232. As noted earlier, however, the act of conceiving may itself be illegal because of fornication or adultery statutes. See supra note 103. Still, the condition of being pregnant is not a
crime in our society.
233. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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they will have custody of a child to abuse in the future.3 As the
Rodriguez court noted, however, a condition prohibiting pregnancy is
not "reasonably related" to future child abuse because any children
born to the probationer could be removed from her custody.3 Indeed,
a no-custody condition would be more effective than Norplant in preventing future child abuse. A Norplant condition only prevents the
probationer from abusing her own future offspring, not other peoples'
children who are in her custody. Given the availability of a no-custody
condition, a Norplant condition is unnecessary and therefore not
"reasonably related" to future criminality. 6 Since a Norplant condition
fails Dominguez's third prong as well, it is unreasonable and invalid
in a typical child-abuse case.
The court in Pointer, however, found a no-conception condition
reasonable under Dominguez.27 Pointer suggests a scenario where a
Norplant condition may be reasonable: women who harm their children
while they are pregnant by using dangerous drugs like cocaine. In
finding the no-conception condition reasonable, the Pointercourt stressed the unique facts of that case.239 Because the defendant strictly
adhered, to a macrobiotic diet that could harm a fetus in utero, a
no-conception condition would prevent her from injuring an unborn
child in the future.m 0 Thus, the condition was related to future criminality and valid under Dominguez.Y1

234. Michael H. Shapiro, Was the Norplant Ruling Unconstitutional?, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 20, 1991, at 7.
235. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
236. Cf. id. (finding that a condition prohibiting pregnancy would "add nothing to decrease
the possibility of further child abuse" and thus holding such a condition unreasonable under
Dominguez's third prong).
237. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
238. In Ohio, the state senate has debated a bill which would create a new crime of "prenatal
child neglect" directed at women who abused drugs while pregnant. See Ohio S.B. No. 324,
118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1989-1990) (proposing § 2919.221(B)). A repeat offender has
the choice of either undergoing sterilization or participating in a five-year contraceptive program.
See proposed § 2919.221(B)(2)(c) in Ohio S.B. No. 324. If the offender fails to remain drug-free
for the five years, then the judge must sentence her to be sterilized. See id. Should the offender
fail to make the election mandated in the statute, then she would be guilty of "aggravated
prenatal child neglect" and sentenced to a possible 25 years in prison. Id. §§ 2919.221(E),
2929.11(B). Similar legislation has been proposed in Kansas and Washington. See Southwick,
supra note 11.
239. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
240. Id. at 364 & n.9.
241. Id. at 364.
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Like adhering to a macrobiotic diet, ingesting cocaine during pregnancy also harms the fetus.2 2 In the case of a woman who abuses
drugs while pregnant, a Norplant condition would probably meet all
three prongs of the Dominguez test.23 Because the harm occurred
during pregnancy, preventing conception and pregnancy would relate
more directly to the crime. A Norplant condition also would target
conduct which itself may be criminal: the transfer of drugs to fetuses.2
Finally, by preventing conception, a Norplant condition would preclude
a probationer from harming an unborn child in the future. Consequently, in the case of a drug-abusing mother, a Norplant condition
may pass the Dominguez test. In more typical child-abuse cases,
however, a Norplant condition would be unreasonable and invalid
under Dominguez.l 15
Even in the case of a drug-abusing mother, a Norplant condition
may be unreasonable if it would be impossible for the woman to adhere
to it. As noted earlier, a probation condition which would be impossible
6
or extremely difficult for the probationer to follow is unreasonable.2
2 7
Some women cannot use Norplant because of medical conditions.
Women who are diabetic, suffer from blood clots, or have heart or
liver problems should not use Norplant.As In these cases, even if a

242. See generally Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J. OF
666, 669 (1985) (concluding that infants exposed to cocaine in utero "are at risk for a
higher rate of congenital malformations and perinatal mortality").
243. Ci Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (holding that a probation condition prohibiting
conception was reasonable under the Dominguez test for a woman whose diet would harm an
unborn child).
244. See Ohio S.B. No. 324, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1989-90). Since the late 1980s,
more and more mothers who used drugs while pregnant and delivered drug-exposed babies are
being charged with various crimes including criminal neglect. Doretta M. McGinnis, Comment,
Prosecutionof Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutionaland Criminal Theory, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 505 (1990). But see Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a
mother could not be prosecuted under Florida Statutes § 893.13(1)(c)(1) for delivering cocaine
to a minor when she ingested the drug while pregnant). See also Roberts, supra note 90
(arguing against criminalizing fetal drug abuse); James Dennison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishmentfor Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103
(1991) (outlining the various commentaries on this subject and arguing against criminalizing
maternal substance abuse).
245. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 4243 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 4243 and accompanying text. This may, in the end, have rendered
the Norplant condition in the Johnson case unreasonable; Darlene Johnson has a heart murmur
and is diabetic. Matthew Rees, Shot in the Arm, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1991, at 16.
MED.
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Norplant condition survives the Dominguez test, it would be unreasonable because it would endanger the probationer's health.- 9
B.

Constitutionality

With the possible exception of cases involving drug-abusing
mothers, a Norplant condition fails the reasonableness test.25 Yet
even in drug-abuse cases, such a condition fails for constitutional
reasons.2 1 As the courts in Pointer, Mosberg, and Rodriguez noted,
a probation condition prohibiting conception or pregnancy burdens a
probationer's constitutional right to procreate . 5 2 A Norplant condition

also burdens this right.5 Consequently, a Norplant condition must
be specially scrutinized to see whether it is narrowly-drawn to serve
the legitimate goals of probation.2- In making this determination, the
probationer's right to procreate should be balanced against the need
for requiring Norplant.5 In the end, the right to procreate outweighs
the need for Norplant.25

249. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that in at
least two respects, a Norplant condition would be easier to administer and monitor than the
no-conception/no-pregnancy conditions invalidated in Pointer and Mosberg. First, in both cases
the courts were concerned that those conditions would be difficult to monitor and enforce.
Pointer,199 Cal. Rptr. at 366; State v. Mosberg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). Most
contraceptives, like the pill, require the user to take regular actions to make the contraceptive
effective. See Findlay, supra note 1, at 62. Not only could the probationer fail to properly
administer such contraceptives, but probation officers would have difficulty monitoring the probationer's use of the contraceptive. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Once implanted, however,
Norplant does not require the probationer's cooperation to be effective. See supra notes 23-35
and accompanying text. Moreover, probation officers would have little difficulty monitoring a
Norplant condition: they need only check the probationer's arm to make sure the device is in
place. See Allstetter, supra note 5, at 32.
Second, in Pointerand Mosberg, the courts were concerned that a no-conception/no-pregnancy
condition could force the probationer to choose between abortion, concealing the pregnancy, or
jail should the probationer become pregnant. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366; Mosberg, 768
P.2d at 315. Because of its convenience and high effectiveness rate, Norplant minimizes the
risk that a probationer would accidentally become pregnant and face this disturbing choice. See
Findlay, supra note 1, at 59.
250. See supra notes 226-49 and accompanying text.
251. See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268-69 (App. Ct. 1992); discussion supra

Part IV.
252. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65; Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979); Mosberg, 768 P.2d at 314.
253. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
254. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).
255. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 276-98 and accompanying text.
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Several arguments favor a Norplant condition in child abuse cases.
Child abuse is a singularly reprehensible crime.- 7 Young children are
normally defenseless against the physical and psychological torments
of adults. Moreover, child abuse can scar a person emotionally and
physically for life.2 Since the state has a strong interest in protecting
children from these injuries,-9 a Norplant condition may be a valid
means of accomplishing this goal.
In addition, the idea that a person unfit to raise a child should not
have the right to bring more children into this world further supports
a Norplant condition.260 Philosopher Onora O'Neill argues that if one
cannot fulfill his or her parental obligations or transfer these obligations to others, then that person has no right to procreate. 26 ' The
presumption is that someone who cannot raise a child or transfer this
task to another actually harms the child.2 2 In child-abuse cases, the

257. In their study of child abuse and neglect, William Stacey and Anson Shupe noted that
this subject "aroused extraordinary, vindictive anger in otherwise respectable citizens whose
backgrounds ranged across a broad spectrum." WILLIAM STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, THE
FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 61 (1983). According to the authors,
some people condemned child abusers as subhumans. Id.
258. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Aside from the obvious physical harm a child may
suffer from abuse, there are an array of psychological harms which could prove even more
damaging in the long run. For example, an abused child can suffer from low self-esteem, difficulty
in trusting others, and sexual and interpersonal problems. See generally FRANK G. BOLTON
& SUSAN R. BOLTON, WORKING WITH VIOLENT FAMILIES 93-114 (1987) (detailing the
psychological trauma suffered by child maltreatment victims).
259. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("[iut is evident beyond the need
for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being
of a minor' is 'compelling' (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
260. See Lev, supra note 6, at A17. This reasoning is implicit in Judge Broadman's defense
of his sentence in the Darlene Johnson case. According to Broadman: "In the present case
[Johnson] has been convicted of brutally beating her children. It is in the defendant's best
interest and certainly in any unconceived child's interest that she not have any more children
until she is mentally and emotionally prepared to do so." Id.
261. Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25 (Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds.,
1979). According to O'Neill: "If decisions to procreate create parental obligations, then those
who realize (or should realize, given the information available to them) that they can neither
discharge nor transfer such obligations have no right to procreate at that time." Id. at 29.
262. Robertson, supra note 90, at 412 (interpreting O'Neill's argument); see O'Neill, supra
note 261, at 29.
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parent's past conduct evinces a glaring inability to parent.m Any interest a child abuser may have in conceiving and bearing a child could
be overridden by the need to prevent harm to the offspring. 26 Accordingly, a condition requiring the use of Norplant for convicted child
abusers may not unduly burden their rights.m
. O'Neill's argument, however, contains a qualification making a
Norplant condition unnecessary. 26 Although a person may not have
the capacity to parent, if that person can transfer this obligation to
others, then that person retains a right to procreate.26 7 A no-custody
condition combined with social mechanisms like foster care and adop2
tion would assure a transfer of parental duties in child-abuse cases. 6
Thus, even under O'Neill's argument, child abusers have a right to
procreate and a Norplant condition would unnecessarily burden this
9
right.26
More importantly, the ability to conceive and bear a child may be
central to a woman's identity. 0 The biological experience of conceiving
and giving birth may be an important part of a woman's life. 1 Some
women find enormous satisfaction and gratification in pregnancy and
childbirth.
For them, procreation is a means of discovering and
expressing their identity.m In this respect, the right to bear a child
"goes to the heart of what it means to be human"' 4 and represents
a "basic civil right."' 5
While there are arguments supporting a Norplant condition in childabuse cases, they do not justify burdening the constitutional and
human right to procreate. Conceiving and bearing a child is a uniquely

263. See O'Neill, supra note 261, at 29.
264. Robertson, supra note 90, at 412; see O'Neill, supra note 261, at 29.
265. A Norplant condition may also allow mothers in Johnson's situation an opportunity to
regain their capacity to parent and thus reassert their right to have children. Lev, supra note
6, at A17. In Johnson's case, Judge Broadman also sentenced her to mental health counseling
and parenting classes. Id. If she had completed these terms, Johnson then may have had the
capacity to conceive and raise more children. See id.
266. Robertson, supra note 90, at 412; see O'Neill, supra note 261.
267. Robertson, supra note 90, at 412; see O'Neill, supra note 261.
268. See Robertson, supra note 90, at 412.
269. See id.
270. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 1472.
271. See id.; Robertson, supra note 90, at 409.
272. See Robertson, supra note 90, at 409. This is one reason why some women are willing
to be surrogates for infertile couples. Id. at 409 n.13.
273. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 1472; Robertson, supra note 90, at 409.
274. Roberts, supra note 15, at 1472.
275. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 315 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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personal experience for a woman. 276 Consequently, the right to procreate deserves the utmost respect. Because there is an alternative
to a Norplant condition in child abuse cases, the need for Norplant
does not outweigh the probationer's right to procreate.2
VI.

AN ALTERNATIVE

As stated earlier, a probation condition burdening a constitutional
right must be narrowly drawn.278 If an alternative condition less restrictive of a probationer's constitutional rights exists, then it should
be employed. 279 Fortunately, there is such an alternative to the
Norplant condition Judge Broadman imposed in the Johnson case. In
Pointer, the court suggested that instead of a no-conception condition,
the trial court could require the probationer to submit to regular
pregnancy testing.- If the probationer became pregnant, she would
have to follow a program of prenatal and neonatal care monitored by
both a probation officer and a supervising physician.81 If the probationer gave birth to a child while on probation, then the court could
remove the child from the mother's custody if this was necessary to
protect the infant. 2
The last condition mentioned by the Pointer court - removing
any newborn from the probationer's custody2 - is the most important. In a typical child abuse case where the abuse occurs after birth,
a no-custody condition would prevent future child abuse as well as
Norplant could. But even in maternal drug abuse cases, the Pointer
alternative would protect against future criminality.284 Should the probationer become pregnant, she would have to submit to a program of
prenatal care. As part of this program, probation officers and physi-

276. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
277. See Robertson, supra note 90, at 433.
278. People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972);
COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 125, at 213.
279. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984); see People v. Arvanites,
95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1971).
280. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66; see People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268-69
(Ct. App. 1992) (implying that the alternatives discussed by the Pointer court would apply in
cases of maternal drug abuse as well).
285. Id. at 365.
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cians could monitor her for signs of drug abuse.? If the probationer
used drugs while pregnant, then social workers and physicians could
treat her for her addiction and take other steps necessary to prevent
the probationer from harming her unborn child. In this manner, the
alternative conditions prescribed in Pointer would serve well in any
child abuse case.
Concededly, the Pointer alternative has its disadvantages. First,
a program of testing, monitoring, and prenatal care might be expensive 2 - probably more so than using Norplant.m Second, the testing
and monitoring would intrude into a probationer's privacy.m Finally,
this alternative would further strain social services like foster care
which are already overburdened.2 °
While these are valid criticisms, the Pointeralternative has several
advantages over Norplant. Foremost among these advantages is that
the Pointer alternative preserves a probationer's right to conceive a
child.21 The probationer can experience the rewards of pregnancy and
childbirth. In this respect, the Pointer alternative may further the
rehabilitation of a child abuser. Under the supervision of social workers
during and after pregnancy, a former child abuser can better appreciate the rewards and obligations of parenting. Whereas a Norplant
condition only protects against future child abuse,2 3 the Pointeralter-

286. See id.
287. See id. In Pointer, the prosecutor claimed that the local social service agencies lacked
the resources for such supervision. Id.
288. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
289. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364. In commenting upon the Johnson case, Professor
Shapiro questioned whether taking a child away from the mother might be no less intrusive
than requiring the use of Norplant. Shapiro, supra note 234.
290. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 101 CONG., 1ST
SESS., No PLACE TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA (Comm. Print 1989).

There were an estimated 276,300 children in foster care nationwide in 1985, and this number
increased to 340,300 by 1988. Id. at 5. In 1989, the House committee concluded:
[T]he reality of today's foster care system falls short of [the] ideal in almost every
way. The number of available foster parents is inadequate and shrinking .... In
addition, there has been insufficient assistance to foster parents to enable them to
support and properly care for these children, many of whom have special needs.
Id. at 51.
291. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
293. Cf. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (concluding that a no-conception condition was
"apparently not intended to serve any rehabilitative purpose but rather to protect the public
by preventing injury to an unborn child"). Judge Broadman, however, in defending his order
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native would advance both goals of probation: rehabilitation and protecting society against future harm.
The Pointer alternative has other advantages as well. First, it
would not require an invasion of the probationer's body. Like the right
to procreate, the integrity of a person's body is a constitutionally
protected privacy interest. 2 Although implanting Norplant requires
a relatively minor surgical procedure, it necessitates anesthesia and
involves the insertion of tubes under the patient's skin.2 5 Moreover,
the probationer must carry this device in her body for a period of
years.2 This goes beyond a simple blood test or vaccination - two
temporary procedures which the Supreme Court has upheld as permissible intrusions of bodily integrity. 297 Second, the Pointeralternative
avoids exposing the probationer to the unknown risks of using
Norplant. While Norplant has few side effects, it is dangerous to
people with certain health conditions.-9 Thus, the Pointeralternative
shows greater respect for the probationer's health and body than does
the Norplant condition.
Though the Pointer alternative has its drawbacks, it would be
more effective than Norplant in meeting the goals of probation. In
child abuse cases, a Norplant condition attempts only to prevent future
child abuse.- 9 The Pointeralternative, however, would not only pre-

requiring Johnson to have Norplant implanted, stated that the order was "reasonably related"
to the goal of rehabilitating Johnson. Lev, supra note 6, at A17.
294. In several cases concerning searches and seizures in the criminal context, the Supreme
Court has implicitly recognized a right to bodily autonomy. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (invalidating an order to pump a suspect's stomach to discover drugs). In another
case, the Court unanimously invalidated a court order requiring the surgical removal of a bullet
from a suspect's body. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). In Winston, the Court argued that
such an invasive procedure "involves a virtually total divestment of [one's] ordinary control over
surgical probing beneath [one's] skin." Id. at 765. Furthermore, in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), the Court stated that "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
In Schmerber, however, the Court held that the Constitution does not forbid authorities
from making "minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions."
Id. The Schmerber Court upheld administering a blood test to a suspect in order to determine
the suspect's blood alcohol level. Id.; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(upholding a compulsory vaccination program). See generally TRIBE, supra note 92, at 1333-34
(outlining the circumstances under which the state may intrude upon a person's body).
295. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 2, 8 and accompanying text.
297. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
298. See Segal, supra note 23, at 10; Findlay, supra note 1, at 59.
299. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (arguing that a no-conception condition focuses on
future criminality, not rehabilitation).
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vent future abuse, but rehabilitate the probationer as well.3°° More-

over, the Pointer alternative furthers these goals while preserving
the probationer's constitutional right to procreate.30 1 Because this alternative avoids burdening the probationer's constitutional rights, it is
more narrowly drawn than a Norplant condition. °2 Since the Pointer
alternative is available to courts, a Norplant condition unnecessarily
33
burdens a probationer's right to procreate and is therefore invalid. 0
VII.

CONCLUSION

Child abuse is an enduring problem in our society and judges naturally feel pressured to find innovative ways to stop it.s°4 In this regard,
Norplant is an enticing option for judges who must sentence convicted
child abusers. A Norplant condition would be easy to monitor"', and
would reduce the offender's opportunity to abuse children in the future.
Given Norplant's unique qualities as a contraceptive, it is not surprising that a judge incorporated it into a probationary sentence.3 06 Judge
30 7
Broadman was the first to require a child abuser to use Norplant,
and other courts may be tempted to follow his lead.
While there is latitude for creative sentencing, 3°8 forcing a child
abuser to have Norplant implanted into her body is judicial overkill.
Some may argue that Judge Broadman never "forced" the Norplant
condition on Johnson: she had the option of declining probation. But
when the alternative is jail, this decision is hardly uncoerced.309 People
will do almost anything to avoid jail.310 Courts have recognized this,
and that is why the "contract/waiver" theory of probation conditions
and the idea that offenders "assent" to their conditions are no longer
3
valid. 11

300. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
302. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.

303. Id.
304. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
305. See Alstetter, supra note 5, at 32. All the probation officer would have to do is check
the woman's upper arm to make certain the Norplant device was in place. See id.
306. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
307. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate, supra note 6, at A3.
308. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
309. See Cantwell, supra note 5, § 4, at 16.
310. Johnson originally agreed to the Norplant condition because she feared serving three
additional years in jail. Lev, supra note 6, at A17.
311. See supra notes 136, 138 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, a Norplant condition is simply unreasonable and
unconstitutional in child abuse cases. 312 The right to procreate is a
human right and is protected by the Constitution. 313 In a typical child
abuse case like Darlene Johnson's, a probation condition preventing
the offender from conceiving a child bears no relationship to the crime
or future criminality. 314 Even in cases where a Norplant condition may
pass the reasonableness test, there is an alternative more humane
than Norplant315 A program of pregnancy testing and prenatal care
combined with a no-custody condition would be more effective than
Norplant in meeting the goals of probation.316 Because this alternative
exists, a Norplant condition is not only unreasonable, it is unconstitu7
tional as well.31
According to the originator of implantable birth-control technology,
Sheldon Segal of the Rockefeller Foundation, Judge Broadman's sentence was "a gross misuse" of Norplant. 31s Indeed, the Darlene Johnson
case illustrates how advancing technology can sometimes jeopardize
cherished individual rights. With its convenience and effectiveness,
Norplant may some day be the preferred contraceptive method for
American women. A court should not, however, force this choice on
a woman in an attempt to find a technological quick fix to the problem
of child abuse.
James H. Taylor

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See discussion supra Parts IV, V.
See discussion supra Part II.
See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part VI.
See supra notes 293 and accompanying text.
See supra note 299-303 and accompanying text.
Stein, Judge Stirs Debate, supra note 6, at A3.
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